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THE ANDEAN COMMUNITY:





HE process of integration between the countries of Bolivia, Co-
lombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela has passed through differ-
ent stages since its beginning in 1969. The Andean Pact (AP) was
the first sub-regional attempt based upon now discredited inner-looking
policies of import-substitution and protective Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) regulations. Although internal and external political factors
played a part, implementation of the Andean Pact was primarily hindered
by economic instability, and it came under deep scrutiny in 1989. During
the early 1990's, a process towards the definition of a new strategic design
took place. The consolidation of the Andean market as an economic area
and the enhancement of the international relations of the Group within
the region and with other economic blocks became the core goals of the
member countries. As a result, important steps were taken to internally
consolidate the Andean Integration such as the creation of the Andean
Community (AC) in 1996 and the Andean President's commitment in
1999 to the goal of establishing the Andean Common Market (ACM) by
2005.
As a result of the policy of open regionalism and under the framework
of the Treaty of Montevideo 1980 Latin America Integration Association
(LAIA), important agreements were reached with countries in the re-
gion. In 1995, Colombia, Venezuela (the main economic partners within
the AC), and Mexico formed the Group of Three (G-3) with the purpose
of establishing a Free Trade Area (FTA) by mid 2004. At first individually
(Bolivia and Peru), and later as a group, Andean members signed several
Partial Scope Agreements (PSAs) with the Common Market of the
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Southern Cone (MERCOSUR) geared towards the establishment of an
VITA to be implemented on July 1, 2004. In addition in 1994, member
countries initiated negotiations towards the establishment of the hemi-
spheric Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which were supposed
to end in 2005. Furthermore, since May 18, 2004, Ecuador, Colombia and
Peru have started simultaneous negotiations with the United States
geared towards setting up individual Preferential Trade Agreements
(PTAs) by 2005.
Certainly, these internal changes and different external commitments
being negotiated or in execution are putting pressure on the Andean In-
tegration Process. This unprecedented environment of deeper sub-re-
gional integration and evolving extra sub-regional negotiations is shaping
the character and nature of the AC, challenging its internal cohesion and
capacity to maneuver within evolving, unpredictable and demanding con-
ditions. Whether she will become stronger, change her nature or simply
disappear is something that cannot be foreseen in the near future. How-
ever, if implementation of the internal changes and the external commit-
ments of the negotiations begin, the actual economic environment of the
Andean Countries will progressively transform, and both their domestic
and supranational legal frameworks will need to be adapted accordingly.
These concurrent and demanding processes impose upon the AC and
the Andean Integration System (AIS) the core tasks of building the insti-
tutions required to that end and delivering the legal reforms involved in
properly implementing, at all levels of their stated commitments. This is
indeed a tremendous undertaking, testing the AC's internal cohesion and
strength. Is the AC sufficiently prepared to take on these simultaneous
challenges? This is a question whose answer relies on three main factors:
1) the political will of the Andean leaders and their capacity to lead the
AIS to a successful achievement of all the considerable assignments im-
posed upon it; 2) the proactive participation of the interest groups in the
negotiations still in place and their effective monitoring of the implemen-
tation of the complex kaleidoscope of internal and external commitments
the AC is facing; and 3) the adequate understanding of the rule of law as
a means of ring-fencing the AC from the political risk and providing su-
pranational and domestic convergence between internal and external
commitments.
II. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ANDEAN COMMON
MARKET AND THE INTERNAL CHANGES AND
CHALLENGES ORIGINATED FROM
ITS IMPLEMENTATION
The establishment and consequent implementation of the ACM consti-
tute one of the most important internal challenges faced by the Andean
process of sub-regional integration after the creation of the AC in 1996.
It represents a further step in the evolving stages of economic sub-re-
gional integration, following the achievement of an FTA and an imperfect
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Customs Union (CU) by the Andean countries. This demanding task has
been undertaken by a sub-regional scheme which has developed certain
specific features during its thirty-five years of existence and is based upon
now-settled internal structures and bodies. Any approach to the ACM
must take these features into consideration in order to assess the feasibil-
ity of having it in place by 2005.
Since its creation as the Andean Pact in 1969, this integration effort has
pursued differential treatment for its members and has been strongly in-
fluenced by the political will of the Andean Presidents. It has also devel-
oped an impressive set of institutions and has been based on certain
economic policies aimed at delivering development and better standards
of living for the Andean citizenry. Among these four characteristics, this
section underlines the direction and impulse given by the Andean Presi-
dents to the scheme during the last decade. It also explores the cohesion
and coherency of the system of institutions and bodies which comprise
the AIS in order to achieve the ACM.
A. FROM THE ANDEAN PACT (1969) To THE ANDEAN COMMUNITY
(1996): EVOLVING INSTITUTION BUILDING AND THE STRONG
INVOLVEMENT OF THE ANDEAN PRESIDENTS
The AP was a step beyond the regional integration efforts already in
place in South America during the 1960s. The Cartagena Agreement
(CA) was created as a sub-regional integration agreement within the orig-
inal Latin America Free Trade Association (LAFTA)1 framework and
was compatible with the goal of Latin American Economic Integration.2
It was an attempt by some Andean countries to increase economic devel-
opment through a policy of industrial development and parallel sub-re-
gional market opening, which at that time seemed like a strategy to
overcome the problems faced by the countries of the sub-region, which
LAFTA could not solve. 3
After its creation, the AP passed through different stages. Following an
1. The Treaty of Montevideo 1960 established the first regional integration effort in
Latin America creating the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFrA),
which was originally signed by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru
and Uruguay. Colombia (1961), Ecuador (1961), Venezuela (1966) and Bolivia
(1967) joined later.
2. Kevin J Middlebrook, Regional Organizations and Andean Economic Integration,
17 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 62, 64-65 (1978). See also William P. Avery & James D.
Cochrane, Subregional Integration in Latin America: the Andean Common Market,
11 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 85, 89 (1972).
3. LAFTA involved countries with diverse levels of development, size, and political
interests. The most industrialized countries (Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil) had a
clear interest in securing a wider market for their products, while smaller and un-
derdeveloped countries focused on creating industrial development. This imbal-
ance was perceived as a disadvantage of the agreement. Rubens Antonio Barbosa,
The Evolution of the Integration Process in South America, introduction to MARTA
HAINES FERRARI, THE MERCOSUR CODES xiv (BIICL, 2000); Middlebrook, supra
note 2, at 64-65 n.4; David E. Hojman, The Andean Pact: Failure of a Model of
Economic Integration, 20 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 139, 139 (1981).
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important boost in the early years, the inclusion of Venezuela in 19734
and the sudden abandonment of Chile in 19765 marked a very difficult
first decade. 6 The political will of the member countries, or the lack of it,
was one of the most important elements present or missed in the early
years of the CA. The AP's original mechanisms and objectives needed
strong and enduring political commitment. In order to make the whole
system functional, member countries set up two main bodies, the Com-
mission and the Board, which in the long run became influenced by the
political attitude of their members.
Due to the increasing non-compliance with the Andean regulation, the
lack of uniform application of the Decisions of the Andean Commission
(AnC), and the inconsistent understanding of the Andean rules, the An-
dean Court of Justice of the CA and the Andean Parliament were created
in 1979. 7 This important move was supposed to bring to the integration
process a great deal of stability and legal certainty. However, if the 1970s
were immersed in volatile and controversial political environments, in the
1980s the countries in the region were shattered by the economic crisis
brought about by the oil8 and international external debt 9 crises.
Certainly, the 1980's ("the lost-decade"), 10 had a tremendous impact
on Latin American economic and social history, and obviously affected
4. For an explanation of the overall consequences of Venezuelan late entry to the
AP, see Avery & Cochrane, supra note 2, at 99-101; Middlebrook, supra note 2, at
79-80.
5. After a military coup in 1973, Chile adopted policies incompatible with those sup-
porting the Andean initiative. Middlebrook, supra note 2, at 81-82; Rafael Vargas-
Hidalgo, The Crisis of the Andean Pact: Lessons for Integration Among Developing
Countries, 17 J. COMMON MKT. STUD., 231, 223 (1979).
6. For a comprehensive analysis of the 1974-1976 crisis of the AP, see Vargas-Hi-
dalgo, supra note 5, at 213-226.
7. The Court of Justice was established by the Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of
the CA 1979, available at http://www.sice.oas.orgrTrade/Junac/Tribunal/cartageA.
asp. The Protocol amending the CA approved in Trujillo, Peru, on March 10, 1996,
modified it into the Court of Justice of the Andean Community (CJAC). The Co-
chabamba Protocol, signed in Bolivia, on May 28, 1996, and applicable since Au-
gust 1999, later modified its statute assigning to it new spheres of competence. The
Andean Parliament is an attempt to create a forum for discussion of integration
issues different from the other Andean bodies, which had strong governmental
influence. Andean Group: Treaty Establishing the Andean Parliament, Oct. 25,
1979, 19 I.L.M. 269.
8. For an explanation of the effects of the oil crisis on the AP, see THOMAS ANDREW
O'KEEFE, LATIN AMERICAN TRADE AGREEMENTS 1-9 (2001); ROBERT DEVLIN &
ANTONI ESTEVADEORDAL, WHAT'S NEW IN THE NEW REGIONALISM IN THE
AMERICAS? (Inter American Development Bank (IADB), Working Paper No. 6,
2001), available at http://www/iadb/org/intal/publicaciones/devlin-estevadeordal
WP6.pdf.; NU CEPAL, AMERICA LATINA EN EL UMBRAL DE LOS Argos 80
(1979).
9. For an interesting explanation of the origins and consequences of the external debt
crisis, see Ross P. BUCKLEY, EMERGING MARKETS DEBT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
SECONDARY MARKET 29-44 (Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999).
10. The ECLAC called the 1980s the lost decade. The same institution called the first
half of the 1990s "A lost half-decade in Latin America." Jose Antonio Ocampo, A
Lost Half-Decade in Latin America, 149-150 THIRD WORLD RESURGENCE 33, 33
(2003).
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the development of the AP.1 1 However, during this devastating crisis, the
Andean integration effort showed one of its more important features - its
endurance and commitment to prevail despite difficulties that have im-
peded the development and delivery of its objectives.
At the time, member countries opted for a pragmatic approach,
amending the CA through the Protocol of Quito 1987.12 It established a
new phase of the AP that would lay the foundation for the formation of
an Andean sub-regional community. Member countries introduced
guidelines for the institutional restructuring of the Andean Group in
which regulations were relaxed to attenuate and give flexibility to the
obligations originally adopted, while individual member countries imple-
mented structural reforms based on market openness. 13 Conscious of the
consequences brought about by the external debt crisis, member coun-
tries determined, along with additional objectives of the Treaty, to reduce
external vulnerability and to improve their positioning within the interna-
tional economic context. 14
The Quito Protocol also made some progress in the institutional field.
It granted to the Commission exclusive legislative capacity in the areas of
its competence 15 and gave to it additional functions aimed at fostering the
sub-regional integration process. As for the Board, it continued to serve
as a technical body, acting as the permanent secretariat located in Lima,
Peru. 16 The Andean Business Advisory Council (ABAC) and the An-
dean Labor Advisory Council (ALAC) were also created with the core
aim of gaining support from the private sector, which had profound reser-
11. A report by the Board of the CA at that time refers that: Today the Andean
Group is being subjected to adverse forces that significantly hold back its progress
and seriously jeopardize the community structures built with so much effort. Cur-
rently there are problems in the field of trade liberalization, difficulties that pre-
vent the industrialization programmes from being implemented, lack of definition
on issues like the common external tariff and many instances where the commit-
ments made in the field of legal regulations have not been fulfilled.
Permanent Secretariat of SELA, Latin America and Caribbean Integration
Schemes in the Face of the International Crisis, available at http://www.sela.org
public-html/AA2K/EN/docs/spclxxvdi9.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2004) (quoting
BOARD OF THE CARTAGENA AGREEMENT, INST IEUTO PARA LA INTEGRACION DE
AMERICA LATINA, ESTRATEGIAS DE DESAROLLO E INTEGRACI6N EN EL GROUP
ANDINO (1985)).
12. SELA, Guide to Latin American and Caribbean Integration 2001, at 4, available at
http://lanic.utexas.edu/-sela/AA2K1/ENG/docs/Integra/SPDi5-O1/SPDi5-01-l.htm
(last visited Sept. 7, 2004) [hereinafter Guide] (pagination on internet may differ
from hard copy); Barbosa, supra note 3; O'Keefe, supra note 8, at 1-7.
13. Barbosa, supra note 3; RENATO BAUMANN, ET AL., Los PROCESOS DE INTEGRA-
CI6N DE LOS PASES DE AMYIRICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE 2000-2001: AVANCES, RE-
TROCESOS Y TEMAS PENDIENTES (United Nations, Report No. 25, 2002); O'Keefe,
supra note 8, at 1-10.
14. Andean Pact: Official Codified Text of the Cartagena Agreement Incorporating
the Quito Protocol, July 26, 1988, art. 1, 28 I.L.M. 1169, 1170 [hereinafter Protocol
of Quito].
15. Id. art. 6-7, at 1172.
16. Id. art. 13, at 1175.
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vations about the success of the AP.17
In addition, the Protocol included in the CA several programs related
to services. 18 The Commission was in charge of formulating them.19
Between May 1989 and December 1991, the Presidents of the Andean
countries convened on nine occasions 20 to evaluate and try to revive the
process. The impetus of the Presidents at the time ended up in the insti-
tutionalization of the Andean Presidential Council (APC) in Machu
Picchu 199021 - one of the most important changes in the structure of
Andean integration. Since then, fifteen meetings have taken place in
which core decisions were made in order to progressively deepen sub-
regional integration by achieving a Free Trade Area, a Customs Union,
and a Common Market. 22
Without any doubt, the introduction of the APC has contributed to the
dynamism of the sub-regional integration effort during the last decade.
Not only were co-related economic policies and structural reforms imple-
mented in each member country, but strong political commitments and
the direct influence by the Member countries' governments have moved
the Andean scheme towards the achievement of its goals.
An overview of the efforts undertaken by the Andean leaders during
the last few years, proves on the one hand, the direct influence of their
political will and, on the other hand, the fragility of the process, which
relies heavily on the leadership of the Andean Presidents. Due to the
APC's consistent work, it only took about four years to build up a solid
and efficient process towards the establishment of an FTA, an agreement
on a Common External Tariff (CET) and a deadline for the establishment
of the ACM.23 Only a period of political turmoil in 1992, when Peruvian
obligations were suspended, stopped the meetings of the Andean Presi-
17. Articles 19 to 21 of the CA, 1969, included a consultative committee and a social
and economic advisory committee, which rarely came into the scene. Agreement
on Andean Subregional Integration, May 26, 1969, Bol.-Colom.-Ecuador-Peru, 8
I.L.M. 910 [hereinafter Cartagena Agreement].
18. Protocol of Quito, supra note 14, art. 3, 28 1.L.M. at 1170-71.
19. Id. arts. 3, 51, at 1170-71, 1186-87.
20. Caracas, February 3, 1989; Cartagena, May 25 and 26,1989; Galapagos, December
17 and 18, 1989; Machu Picchu, May 22 and 23, 1990; Lima, July 28, 1990; Bogota,
August 7, 1990; La Paz, November 29 and 30, 1990; Caracas, May, 17 and 18; and
Cartagcna, December 3 and 5, 1991. In April 1992, Peru's membership was sus-
pended when its President, Alberto Fujimori, abrogated the Country's Constitu-
tion and closed the Courts and Congress. The Andean Presidential meetings
resumed three years afterwards in Quito on September 5, 1995
21. See Instrument for the Creation of the Andean Presidential Council, May 23, 1990,
in Documentos de las Reuniones del Consejo Presidencial Andino, available at
http://www.comunidadandina.org/cumbreSC/Presidentes.pdf.
22. A complete set of the documents issued in each one of the Andean Presidential
summits from 1989-2002 can be found in Spanish. Comunidad Andina Secretaria
General, Documents De Las Reuniones Del Consejo Presidencial Andino (2002),
available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/cumbreSC/Presidentes.pdf (last vis-
ited Sept. 7, 2004).
23. In La Paz, Bolivia, in November 1990, the Andean Presidents established Decem-
ber 31, 1991, as the new deadline for forming the AFTA and defining the ACET.
The previous deadline for ACM establishment was 1995.
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dents affecting the speed and overall results of the process during the
following years.24
Notwithstanding these circumstances, progress took place after Peru's
suspension. Bolivia, Colombia, and Venezuela opened their markets up
on September 30,1992. In January 1993, Ecuador opened its market to
Venezuela. 25 Thereafter, in 1993, the Andean FTA started operating fully
for all countries, except Peru.26 All products were liberated, and there
was no list of exceptions.
Reaching a CET has not been easy. The original CA of 1969 visualized
the establishment of a CU by 1980. However, the entire process has
taken fifteen years more than initially planned, delivering an incomplete
CU subject to exceptions (countries, sectors, and products) and delaying
its application. Through Decision 370 on November 26, 1994, the Com-
mission of the CA approved the CET, which started operating in Febru-
ary 1995. It was implemented only by Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela
while Bolivia maintained a special tariff schedule, as authorized by the
Act of Barahona.27 In the Santa Cruz Declaration of 2002, the Andean
Presidents determined new CET levels, 28 and on April 14, 2003, the An-
dean countries completed the necessary agreements for the adoption of
the Andean Community External Tariff (ACET).29 However, in a meet-
ing of the Commission of the Andean Community (CAC) in May 2004,
24. The entire process was affected by external political factors, which happened in
April 1992 and 1993. Peru's membership was suspended in 1992 when its Presi-
dent, Alberto Fujimori, abrogated the Country's Constitution and closed the
Courts and Congress in 1992. Decision 321: Suspensi6n Temporal del Peru, IX
GACETA OFICIAL DEL ACUERDO DE CARTAGENA 1, 1 (1992) [hereinafter Decision
321]. In addition, following impeachment procedures, Venezuelan President Car-
los Andres Perez was- forced to resign in 1993.
25. Decision 324: Arancel Externo Comtin, Programa de Liberacirn e Incentivos a las
Exportaciones Intrasubregionales, IX GACETA OFICIAL DEL ACUERDO DE CAR-
TAGENA 3, 3-4, art. 7 (1992).
26. On July 30, 1997, Peru and the other Andean member countries agreed on the full
incorporation of Peru to the AFTA. The CAC issued Decision 414 on July 23,
1997, decreeing that a program of liberalization would start in August of 1997 with
full integration occurring by 2005. Decision 414: Perfeccionamiento de la Integra-
ci6n Andina, XII GACETA OFICIAL DEL ACUERDO DE CARTAGENA 1, 1-2, art. 1
(1997).
27. The Andean Presidents defined a CET with four levels (5, 10, 15, and 20%) al-
lowing Bolivia to have only two of 5% and 10%, and special conditions for the
automobile sector. Decision 370: Arancel Externo Comdn, XI GACETA OFICIAL
DEL ACUERDO DE CARTAGENA 1, 1, arts. 1-2 (1994). The automobile sector was
the exception with a tariff of 40%. Id. This CET would be operative from January
1, 1992, until January 1994, the date at which it would be reduced to three levels (5,
10, and 15%), letting Bolivia keep its special conditions. All lists of exceptions
would be abolished by January 1, 1993, granting special regimes for Ecuador and
Bolivia. All incentives to exports would be finished by December 31, 1992. In
Cartagena, Colombia in December 1991, the Presidents approved the Act of
Barahona with great implications for the FTA and the CU.
28. Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela will apply a CET by December 31, 2003.
ACET would be organized into four levels: 0, 5, 10, and 20. Bolivia would not
apply the 20 level.
29. Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia are able to harmonize 100% of the
CET, while Peru reconciles 62%. For practical purposes, the first four countries
would implement Decision 535 and Peru would apply Decision 370. Andean Com-
2004]
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the Andean Foreign Trade Ministers unanimously agreed to postpone the
effective date of the new CET established by Decision 535, until May 10,
2005. Thereafter, the Andean countries are authorized to apply tariff
levels effective in each country.30
In September 1995, the Andean Presidential meetings resumed even
though an old border dispute between Ecuador and Peru regarding the
Amazonia resurfaced that year,, leading to hostilities between the two
Andean countries. 31
In 1995, a new strategic design for the CA was approved in Quito, Ec-
uador. The Andean Presidents took into account the international envi-
ronment of increasing globalization and consolidation of regional blocks
as well as the need for poverty reduction and peace in the Western Hemi-
sphere. With that in mind, they channeled the Andean process into
deeper sub-regional integration through the establishment of the ACM.
At the same time, they promoted the external projection of the Andean
Group in the region and in other blocks, and also consolidated and
strengthened the actions related to the social and sectoral aspects of the
process.
In order to adapt the Andean integration process to the changing envi-
ronment of the 1990s, the Andean leaders focused on the structural re-
form of the AP by setting up the AIS including all bodies and institutions
already in place. The New Strategic Design approved in Quito in 1995
was the basis for the Trujillo Protocol of 1996 by which the AP trans-
formed into the AC and created the AIS32 in order to promote effective
co-ordination between the different bodies and institutions (about four-
teen) that comprise it.33
The AIS is composed of: (1) the APC as the highest-level body;34 (2)
the Andean Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (ACFM) or the polit-
ical leadership body;35 (3) the Commission (CAC), the main policy-mak-
ing body;36 (4) the General Secretariat (AGS) acting as the executive
munity General Secretariat/Customs Union, Common External Tariff, at http://
www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/union/comon.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2004).
30. Press Release, Andean Community General Secretariat, Andean Ministers Agree
to Postpone the Effective Date of the CET and Deepen Commercial Integration
(May 5, 2004), at http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/press/np5-5-04.html.
31. On August 26, 1998, Peru and Ecuador signed the Peace Agreement and the
Agreement to Accelerate and Intensify their free trade.
32. Trujillo Protocol Modifying the Andean Subregional Integration Agreement (Car-
tagena Agreement), Mar. 9-10, 1996, in Documentos de las Reuniones del Consejo
Presidencial Andino, available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/cumbreSC/Pre-
sidentes.pdf.
33. AIS was also set up to deepen Andean sub-regional integration, promote its exter-
nal presence, and consolidate and strengthen actions related to the integration pro-
cess. See Cartagena Agreement, as amended by the Trujillo Protocol 1996, and
codified by Decision 406, art. 7, available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/nor-
mative/tratprot/acuerdo.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2004) [hereinafter Modified Car-
tagena Agreement].
34. Id. arts. 11-14.
35. Id. arts. 15-20.
36. Id. arts. 21-28.
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body of the system; 37 (5) the Court of Justice of the AC (CJAC), the
judicial body;38 (6) the Andean Parliament (AP) or the deliberative
body;39 (7) the Advisory Institutions;4° (8) the Financial Institutions;41 (9)
Social Conventions;42 and finally, (10) the Sim6n Bolfvar Andean
University.43
The Andean Pact was created in a period where state-led institutions
and programs were influential in domestic models of development. Even
though a change in the economic policies during the 1990s promoted
privatization and diminution in the size of the State, and also lessened
Constitutional Presidential attributions, the dependency of the Andean
Community on the political will of its leaders has not changed. Further-
more, the institutions and bodies re-invented in the last reforms are still
strongly influenced by the local governments with little room for private
entrepreneurs.
This sense of "public ownership" of the process has kept private initia-
tive far from convinced of the real benefits of the sub-regional scheme.
Interest groups remain cynical about the achievement of the Andean
aims. Their position within the Andean committees is frequently cynical,
and an example of this cynicism can be found in the Andean Summit in
Quirama, Colombia, in 2003. 44
This strong political control over almost all the main bodies and institu-
tions of the IAS may be conducive to a rapid process of implementing the
guidelines issued by the Andean Presidential Council, assuming there is
consensus and political will. Nevertheless, the structure becomes utterly
bureaucratic when the Presidential commitments are not duly and timely
implemented, becoming unfulfilled promises. Due to the remaining polit-
icalization of the Andean bodies and institutions, the AIS is highly vul-
nerable to external shocks, such as political changes and
misunderstandings among member countries.
The formally impressive AIS is still in its early stages of being fully
operative. Only the rule of law will bring real balance to it. It will hap-
pen when the responsibilities of each one of the bodies and institutions
comprising the AIS are clearly determined, when supranationality and
37. Id. arts. 29-39.
38. Id. arts. 40-41.
39. Id. arts. 42-43.
40. They are the Andean Business Advisory Council (ABAC) and the Andean Labor
Advisory Council (ALAC). Id. art. 44.
41. They are CAF and FLAR. Id. arts. 45-46.
42. The social conventions are intergovernmental institutions created to complement
the integration efforts in other fields different from the economic and trade sec-
tors. These are the Hip6lito Undnue created to support the member countries'
efforts to improve their peoples' health and the Sim6n Rodrfguez Convention to
promote social and labour integration.
43. For more information, see Andean Community website, available at http://www.
comunidadandina.org/ingles/who/university.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2004).
44. Luis Carlos Villegas Echeverri, Address at Quirama, Colombia (2003), in Andres
Mompotes & Carlos Salgado, Cumbre de Incumplidos, EL TIEMPO, June 26, 2003,
at 1-2.
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direct application of Andean regulation become more than a formality
and when the authority of the CJCA is fully respected in every Member
State. In this sense, the independent work of the Secretariat putting to-
gether coherent proposals to that end could introduce dynamism and co-
ordination to the system.
In order to assess the changes and challenges faced by the AC upon
achieving the aim of the ACM, it is essential to study the work done by
the APC in this area. To that end, the next sub-section discusses the main
guidelines issued by the Andean Presidents during the last seven Andean
Summits. 45 Equally, it considers the work carried out to date by the bod-
ies and institutions of the AIS.46 Whether the AIS has been capable of
creating the conditions for the smooth and timely establishment of the
ACM is an issue the jury is still considering.
B. THE LONG AND WINDING ROAD TOWARDS THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF THE ACM: FROM 1989 To 2005 AND BEYOND
The establishment of the ACM can be traced back to the Galapagos
Summit, December 1989. The Andean Presidents adopted a Strategic
Design47 aimed at consolidating the Andean economic area, promoting,
among other six objectives, the growth of flows of capital, goods, services,
and labour within the sub-region.48 In La Paz, Bolivia, in November
1990, the Andean Presidents accelerated the integration process bringing
forward the deadline for forming the FTA and defining the Andean CET.
They also ordered the establishment of the ACM by 1995. 49 In Caracas,
Venezuela in May 1991 and Cartagena, Colombia in December 1991, the
Andean leaders carried on with the process of evaluating the achieve-
ments and imparting guidelines related to the harmonization of
macroeconomic policies. However, as explained above, the entire pro-
cess was affected in 1992-1993 by external political factors, 50 which lead
to the suspension of the APC summits for three years, until the transfor-
mation of the AP into the AC, effective from June 3, 1997.
45. Defining sub-regional integration policy became a historical responsibility of the
Andean Presidents, which finally was institutionalized, becoming part of CA,
through its article 12. See a summary of the main guidelines related to the ACM in
Table I in the following sub-section I.B.
46. See a summary of the main regulation related to the ACM to date in the following
sub-section, Table II.
47. The Strategic Design for the Future Orientation of the Andean Group was based
on two main objectives: (1) to consolidate the Andean market as an economic
area; and (2) to enhance international relations of the Group within the region and
with other international blocks. See Decision 321, supra note 24, at 39-93.
48. In relation to services, it proposed a gradual and selective liberalization of services
related to the productive sector, transportation, telecommunications, and tourism.
Financial services were not referred to within the text. Id.
49. In the Annex to the La Paz Declaration, there is a detailed plan, schedules, and
programmes for the achievement of the ACM. They instructed the Andean bodies
and institutions to intensify their work on harmonization of macroeconomic poli-
cies and those related to transport, telecommunications, and services, and to mod-
ify the Andean regulation related to foreign investment and Andean enterprises.
50. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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From the Sucre IX Summit in 1997 onwards, the APC imparted guide-
lines to the different bodies and institutions of the AIS for the establish-
ment of the ACM, shown in Table 1. The APC meets at least annually
and is responsible for issuing guidelines about different matters related to
Andean sub-regional integration.51 The Chairman of the APC is bound
to ensure that the other AIS bodies and institutions carry out these guide-
lines in accordance with responsibilities and mechanisms established in
their respective treaties and instruments. 52
What is the legal nature of these Presidential guidelines? The Treaty
Creating the CJAC 1996 establishes the legal system of the AC,53 which
does not include the Presidential guidelines. 54 Therefore, they are not
binding for member countries and should be considered as internal gen-
eral frameworks establishing parameters and criteria of action for the
AIS. Following Chapter II of the CA and consequently the APC being
the highest-level body of the AIS, the guidelines are internally binding
for all its bodies and institutions. 55
APC has entrusted CAC with the major responsibilities along with
ACFM. The AGS has the gigantic task of supporting these bodies, under-
taking the studies and analysis required and drafting proposals and regu-
lations accordingly.
One of the main ACFM duties as the political leadership body is to
carry out the guidelines given to it by APC and to ensure that those given
to the other bodies and institutions of the AIS are performed. 56 The
Council expresses itself through Declarations and Decisions adopted by
consensus. Its Declarations are statements that are non-binding, while its
Decisions are legally binding and therefore form part of the Andean
51. Modified Cartagena Agreement, supra note 33, art. 11.
52. Id. art. 14(c).
53. Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Andean Community, March 10, 1996,
Bol.-Colom.-Ecuador-Peru-Venez., art. 1, available at http://www.comunida-
dandina.org/ingles/treaties/trea/ande-trie2.htm [hereinafter TCCJCA].
54. The legal system of the AC consists of: (1) the CA, its Protocols and additional
instruments; (2) TCCJCA and its amending protocols; the Decisions of the ACFM
and of the CAC; (3) the Resolutions of the AGS; and (4) the Industrial Comple-
mentarity Agreements and any such other agreements as the member countries
may adopt among themselves within the context of the Andean sub-regional inte-
gration process. See Marcel Tangarife, Sistema Jurisdiccional en el Proceso Andino,
in Integraci6n y Supranacionalidad 157-208 (2001).
55. It is interesting to consider the legal implications of Decisions enacted beyond or
in contradiction with the APC guidelines and the likelihood of declaring the nullity
of them by the CJAC, which in the opinion of the author, formally, is very high.
Due to the generality of the guidelines, it will be difficult to prove unless there is
gross contradiction between guidelines and Decisions and Resolutions. The CJAC
may declare the nullity of Decisions of the ACFM and CAC, Resolutions of the
AGS, and the Agreements referred to in article 1, paragraph (e), if enacted or
agreed upon in violation of the provisions comprising the legal system of the An-
dean Community, and even for the deviation of power. This has to be requested
by a member country, ACFM, CAC, AGS, or natural or artificial persons whose
rights or interests are affected as provided for in article 19 TCCJCA. See TCCJCA,
supra note 53, at art. 17.
56. See Modified Cartagena Agreement, supra note 33, arts. 15-16.
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Community Law governed by the Charter of the CJCA.57 In order to
achieve the best possible coordination within the AIS, the Chairman of
the ACFM calls and chairs the Meetings of Representatives of the institu-
tions that comprise the System. Among other issues, this annual meeting
is set up to exchange information about the actions taken by the respec-
tive institutions to carry out the guidelines issued by the APC.58
The ACC, in turn, is the main policy-making body.59 It issues Deci-
sions, sharing the legislative role with the ACFM. 60 Among other re-
sponsibilities, the ACC's must adopt the necessary measures for
implementing APC guidelines. 61 According to Chapter VIII, article 79 of
the Cartagena agreement, as amended by the Sucre Protocol, the ACC is
in charge of approving the general framework of principles and provi-
sions for liberalising intra-sub-regional services.
This structure generates significant political and legal issues as the APC
determines the general content of a future regulation, which will be dis-
cussed and enacted by bodies, formed of non-democratically elected
members whose decisions will have direct application within the domestic
legislation of the member countries.62 In fact the ACFM is made up of
the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the member countries, and the ACC is
composed of a plenipotentiary representative from each one of the mem-
ber governments. Their composition depends entirely on the will, inter-
est and ideology of the local governments. As establishing a Common
Market implies regulating broader areas than those related to an FTA of
a CU, the AC's design might bring unrest to domestic political parties
supporting or in opposition, and to interest groups when the Andean reg-
ulation starts affecting them.
Table II shows the main Andean regulation related to the ACM. The
AIS has yielded important achievements in the area of liberalization of
services. In 1998 the General Framework of Principles and Provisions for
Liberalising Trade in Services in the Andean Community was approved,
and three years later in 2001, the CAC finally adopted the Inventory of
Measures Restricting Trade in Services. Areas such as trade in telecom-
munications, intellectual property, the development and integration of
tourism and tax harmonisation have received a great deal of attention.
However, the process has been rather slow and laborious.
57. Id. arts. 17-18. Decisions become binding for member countries as of the date they
are approved by the ACFM or the CAC. See TCCJCA, supra note 53, art. 2. These
Decisions and Resolutions of the AGS are directly applicable in member countries
as of the date they are published in the Official Gazette of the Agreement, unless
they indicate a later date. See also id. art. 3.
58. Modified Cartagena Agreement, supra note 33, art. 9.
59. Id. arts. 21-28.
60. Id. art. 21.
61. Id. art. 22.
62. See Andres Franco, Propriedades de la Politica Exterior de los Paises Miembros de
la Comunidad Andina, in HACIA UNA POLtTICA EXTERIOR COMON DE LA
COMUNIDAD ANDINA 236 (Jeannette Sinchez Naranjo ed., 1999).
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During its existence, the Andean scheme reveals a recurrent tendency
to establish time limits which seem reasonable to the setters but are not
complied with. Inadequate planning and the establishment of unrealistic
targets are also features present within the process of integration, which
bring imbalances among the bodies and institutions of the AIS, imposing
on some of them tremendous amounts of work and responsibilities with-
out proper funding63 and structural support. It gives a sense of improvi-
sation and unreliability to the Andean citizenry.
As shown in Table II, the establishment of the ACM has become a
heavy burden on CAC and AGS. Compare Table I (Presidential guide-
lines) with Table II (regulation in place). While the APC keeps reaffirm-
ing the commitment towards the ACM by 2005, there are areas such as
movement of capital (regulation dating from 1991), liberalization of fi-
nancial services (none) and circulation of persons (with some exceptions)
in which AIS has not yet delivered meaningful results. It was expected
that by the APC Summit held in Cuenca, Ecuador, in July 2004, regula-
tion related to the liberalization of Financial Services and other sectors
would be enacted. But it was not.
Trade in services, capital and labour is still nascent within the AC. The
Andean regulation is in the process of being drafted and issued with lim-
ited participation of the private sector.64 Therefore, the domestic imple-
mentation of the binding supranational Andean regulation may produce
a certain degree of resistance, as the consequences of an enhanced An-
dean market for capital, services and labour are far from clear to and not
entirely assessed by the private sector. In addition to their historically
cynical approach to the Andean scheme, interest groups seem to be dis-
tracted by the on-going negotiations of PTAs with stronger non-members.
This is certainly not an optimal environment for the successful achieve-
ment of the ACM.
Table I contains the APC guidelines for the establishment of the ACM.
Column 1 details the year of the APC Summit and the major declaration
(Act) issued by the Andean Presidents. The following columns display
the main responsibilities given to CAC, AGS, ACFM, ACTM/CB/CBA
and other bodies of the AIS by the APC.
63. In March 2004, AC celebrated a cooperation agreement with the IDB. An amount
of $250,000 will be destined, together with funds from the AC member countries,
to bring technical support to the negotiations of the PTAs with the United States
and the FTAA. See Press Release, CAN Achieves BID's Cooperation in Support
of Andean Countries' Commercial Negotiations (Mar. 3, 2004), available at http://
www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/press/np3-3-04.htm. Similar cooperation agree-
ments have been signed with CAF (May 2004) for $194,000 to support commercial
negotiations. See http://www.comunidadandina.org/prensa/notas/np24-5-04a.htm.
These are indeed important developments in support of these processes.
64. AGS has carried on important efforts to that end. For instance, on March 30, 2004,
it invited Andean bankers to be informed and to express their opinions about the
process towards financial integration and the regulation drafted. See Press Release,
Wagner Invoca a Banqueros a Impulsar [a lntegraci6n Financiera en la CAN (Mar.
30, 2004), available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/prensa/notas/np30-3-
04.htm.
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Table II shows the results of the work of the CAC and ACFM, naming
the main Andean regulation actually in place, enacted by these bodies in
the areas of Services, Investment, Labour and Taxation.
III. THE CHANGES AND CHALLENGES IMPOSED ON THE
AC BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POLICY OF
OPEN REGIONALISM
As a consequence of the domestic structural reforms starting in the
1980s and carried out during the 1990s, a certain degree of policy harmo-
nization in the macroeconomic and trade areas took place in Latin
America, boosting economic interdependence. The "consolidation of a
coherent, stable macroeconomic framework, unilateral trade liberaliza-
tion, non-discriminatory promotion of exports, deregulation and elimina-
tion of obstacles to foreign investment, privatizations and the lifting of
payment restrictions" 65 were similar tendencies that configured what is
called by ECLAC66 de facto integration.67 This process did not require
any kind of negotiations among the Andean countries within the frame-
work of the CA. It was negotiated unilaterally with multilateral interna-
tional institutions with the aim of bringing stability to the local economies
according to each country's needs.68 This "strategy," conceived by G-10
and implemented by multilateral international institutions, was further
strengthened in order to prevent economic crises with the capability of
threatening international financial stability due to the different crises still
erupting in developing countries during the 1990s. 69
65. ECLAC, Open Regionalism in Latin America and the Caribbean: Economic Inte-
gration as a Contribution to Changing Production Patterns with Social Equity,
§ 2(b)(17), available at http://www.eclac.ci/publicaciones/SecretariaEjecutiva/1/
lcglg0l/lcgl80li.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2004) [hereinafter Open Regionalism].
See also GARY C. HUFBAUER & BARBARA KOTSCHWAR, THE FUTURE OF RE-
GIONAL TRADING ARRANGEMENTS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE (Institute for
International Economics, 1998), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/geograph/pa-
pers/iie/hufbauer0998.asp. See also Guide, supra note 12, at 9. For further explana-
tions related to the broader concept of "new regionalism", see DEVLIN &
ESTEVADEORDAL, supra note 8; CEPAL, supra note 8.
66. ECLAC is the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean. Its Spanish acronym is CEPAL. ECLAC has developed its own school
of thought being extremely influential within the region. See ECLAC website,
available at http://www.eclac.cl/acerca/default-i.asp (last visited Sept. 7, 2004).
67. See Open Regionalism, supra note 65.
68. See Guide, supra note 12, at 8-11.
69. See GROUP OF TEN, FINANCIAL STABILITY IN EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES
(Bank for International Settlements, 1997), at http://www.bis.org/publ/gten02.pdf
(last visited Sept. 7,2004). See also MORRIS GOLDSTEIN & PHILIP TURNER, BANK-
ING CRISES IN EMERGING ECONOMIES: ORIGINS AND POLICY OPTIONS (Bank for
International Settlements, Paper No. 46, 1996), available at http://www.bis.org/
publ/econ46.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2004). See Stephany Griffith Jones, Develop-
ing Countries and Global Financial Systems , available at http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/
global/Conf/pdfs/GFA.pdf (June 22-23, 2000); World Bank Group, Reports of the
Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs),available at http://www.worldbank.
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The resulting need to open markets to foreign trade invigorated inte-
gration schemes during the late 1990s. As countries in the region shared
the same market-oriented economic policies, "the impact of concessions
given to each other was not very different from the concessions given to
third countries. '70 In this sense, bilateral and trilateral arrangements ap-
peared as well as several preferential trade arrangements. For instance,
PSAs provided for in the Montevideo Treaty of 1980 brought about
MERCOSUR. 71 Reciprocal FTAs were negotiated mainly by Chile and
between sub-regional schemes. The establishment of the G-3 between
Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela is another example.
All these circumstances gave rise to what is defined by ECLAC as
"Open regionalism." As stated by this institution, it is:
[A] process of growing economic interdependence at the regional
level, promoted both by preferential integration agreements and by
other policies in a context of liberalization and deregulation, geared
towards enhancing the competitiveness of the countries of the region
and, in so far as possible, constituting the building blocks for a more
open and transparent international economy. 72
Open regionalism contains two antithetical propositions.73 On the one
hand, it advocates regional integration as opposed to multilateral or
global integration. Regionalism implies certain preferences among the
members and a degree of protection against non-members. On the other,
it proposes openness to other countries, blocks and economies through
different means, among them, multilateralism.
This two-folded definition implies an enormous degree of multiple in-
teractions.74 First of all, there are interactions within the countries of the
sub-region. Secondly, there are interactions with non-members and with
other arrangements or regional schemes which could be negotiated and
agreed in blocks or individually. Additionally, there is a high degree of
difficulty in finding the right balance among the particular concerns and
interest of the Andean member countries and those of the Latin Ameri-
can region as a whole when negotiating with other countries (such as the
United States) and blocks (i.e. the European Union).
70. See Guide, supra note 12, at 24.
71. See id. at 62. See also O'KEEFE, supra note 8, 1-11.
72. Open Regionalism, supra note 65, para. 7. See also Guide, supra note 12, at 9. See
also Shahid Javed Burki & Guillermo E. Perry, Towards Open Regionalism, in
TRADE: TOWARDS OPEN REGIONALISM - PROCEEDINGS OF AN ANNUAL WORLD
BANK CONFERENCE 3-9 (Shahid Javed Burki et al. eds., 1998).
73. Eduardo Mayobre, The Rules of the World Game in Latin America's Foreign Pol-
icy, 53 CAPrrULOS DEL SELA 51, 60 (1998) (commenting on the concept of open
regionalism). See also Percy S. Mistry, Open Regionalism: Stepping Stone or Mill-
stone toward an Improved Multilateral System?, in REGIONALISM AND THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY: THE CASE OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 11-18
(Jan Joost Teunissen, ed., FONDAD 1995).
74. See SELA's Permanent Secretariat, Some Thoughts of the Dynamics on Latin
America's and the Caribbean's External Relations, 55 CAPITULOS DEL SELA 7, 8-9
(1999) (discussing the implications of open regionalism), available at http://lanic.
utexas.edu/-sela/AA2K/ES/cap/N55/rcap55-1.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2004).
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A. LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTS OF THE POLICY OF OPEN
REGIONALISM AND ITS ARTICULATION WITHIN THE AC LAW
AND THE AIS: FIXING A HOLE
I. Legal Development
As seen in section I, the AP was conceived as an inner-looking integra-
tion agreement which did not encourage open trade with non-members,
at least, in its early stages. This feature was included in the drafting of the
original CA. Even though the AP was established within LAFTA's
framework aimed at encouraging Latin American integration, article 68
obliged member countries to consult to the AnC before unilaterally
granting any tariff preference to non-members in the region. 75 With this
mechanism, the AP wanted to promote coordination among its members,
as negotiations at the time were generally conducted on a bilateral basis
(member/non-member) and not as a bloc. 7 6
As a consequence of the economic crisis of the 1980s, Andean coun-
tries started looking for other markets and engaging in bilateral agree-
ments with non-members under LAIA's umbrella. These actions affected
the cohesion of the AP. In the early 1990s, before the AP embraced open
regionalism, the Andean Presidents allowed a certain degree of openness,
at least towards the Caribbean countries and those within the region,
while at the same time imposing discipline on the members. Through the
Act of Barahona in 1991, the Andean Presidents established that negotia-
tions with Latin American and Caribbean countries should preferably be
of a communal nature. However, the Presidents considered any bilateral
negotiations acceptable when it was impossible to negotiate as a block.77
The AnC adopted this guideline with Decision 322 on August 25, 1992.78
It was the legal basis for the negotiations between Colombia, Mexico and
Venezuela for the creation of the G-3 and the origin of a period of in-
creasing commitments with non-members.
At the same time, as seen above in section I.A., the Andean leaders
started shaping, Summit by Summit, the features of the Andean integra-
75. See Victor Rico Frontaura, La Coordinaci6n y Negociaci6n de los Paises de la
Comunidad Andina en el Marco del ALCA y la OMC, available at http://www.iadb.
org/intal/publicaciones/RicoDD-IECI-O1.pdf, (last visited Sept. 7, 2004). See also,
EDGAR MONCAYO JIMIgNEZ, LAS RELACIONES EXTERNAS DE LA COMUNIDAD
ANDINA: ENTRE LA GLOBALIZACION Y EL REGIONALISMO ABIERTO (1999);
HACIA UNA POLTICA EXTERIOR COMUN DE LA COMUNIDAD ANDINA, supra note
62.
76. The actual CA article 86 regulates the subject obliging member countries not to
unilaterally alter the customs duties set in the CET and to hold consultations with
CAC before assuming tariff obligations with countries outside the sub-region.
Modified Cartagena Agreement, supra note 33, art. 86.
77. Act of Barahona, Dec. 3-5, 1991, Bol.-Colom.-Ecuador-Peru-Venez., available at
http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/Junac/VIacta_s.asp.
78. It allows member countries to advance their bilateral negotiations with other coun-
tries in the region, provided that at least two members of the Andean Group are
involved. Andean Community, Decision 322: Trade Relations with the Countries of
ALADI and of Central America and the Caribbean, available at http://www.comuni
dadandina.org/ingles/treaties/dec!D322e.htm (Dec. 5, 1991).
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tion until it became the AC. Within this progressive work, the APC de-
veloped the basis for the creation of an Andean Common External Policy
whose structure was included in Chapter III of the CA through the Sucre
Protocol 1997.
2. Institutional Effects
ACFM is in charge of formulating the Andean Common Foreign Policy
(ACFP) on matters that are of interest to the sub-region. 79 ACFM and
CAC are also entrusted with defining and implementing a community
strategy aimed at deepening integration with other economic blocks in
the region and establishing political, social and economic-trade relations
with other groups outside the region.8 0 ACFM and CAC can coordinate
joint negotiations of the AC with other integration processes or with third
countries or groups of countries.81 They can also instruct the AGS to
perform research, studies and activities that will make it possible to
achieve the objective stated in Chapter III of CA and to carry out the
measures needed. 82
Even though the AC has international legal capacity or status,83 the
individual Presidents of the member countries or their representatives
have signed all economic agreements (PTAs) with non-members. This
will continue until this legal capacity is clearly defined and allocated
within AIS. At the same time, although it makes sense to entrust the
Ministers of Foreign Affairs with formulating the overall ACFP,84 eco-
nomic integration agreements are mainly related to trade. It supposes at
least the primary involvement of the Ministers of Trade of the Member
countries. However, they do not have a relevant formal role in the for-
mulation of the Andean strategy and under the formal CA they are not
the main coordinators of the negotiations with third countries or blocks,
being under the leadership of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the
members of the CAC. Furthermore, as a result of the institutional design,
CAC and AGS are overwhelmed with additional responsibilities as there
are several agreements under simultaneous negotiation and implementa-
tion, apart from the demanding duties related to the establishment of the
ACM. Finally, the AIS keeps making the same mistake of not including
79. Modified Cartagena Agreement, supra note 33, art. 50.
80. Id. art. 51.
81. Id. art. 52(b).
82. Id. art. 52(c).
83. Id. art. 48.
84. See Andean Community, Decision 458: Common Foreign Policy Guidelines, avail-
able at http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/treaties/dec/D458e.htm (May 25,
1999). See also Andean Community, Decision 475: Directive No. I of the Common
Foreign Policy, available at http://www.comunidadandina.org (last visited Sept. 1,
2004); Andean Community, Decision 476: Follow-up of the Common Foreign Pol-
icy, available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/treaties/dec/D476e.htm
(Apr. 27, 2000); Andean Community, Decision 499: Updating of Directive I on the
Formulation and Execution of the Common Foreign Policy, available at http://www.
comunidadandina.org/ingles/treaties/dec/D499e.htm (June 22, 2001).
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the private sector when designing common strategies and coordinating
negotiations, confirming its nature of being a government-lead scheme.
The final result for the AC is its inability to have a strong strategy able
to support the policy of open regionalism recurrently advocated by the
Andean Presidents. In the middle of several simultaneous negotiations
the counter-party has found the Andean's Achilles Heel: its nascent and
shy common external policy. The possibilities of acting as a block are
minimal if each country is invited to negotiate individually by a party
which understands the benefits of negotiating with counter-parties with
weak bargaining power.
The AGS introduced the concept of variable geometries in an attempt
to uphold Andean cohesion within an environment of increasing expecta-
tions towards agreements with non-members.8 5 It means that "within the
context of a legal system generally characterized by equal rights and du-
ties to its members and by unitary legal regime, room is left open for
special arrangements chosen by the members and granted to them under
special circumstances. '"86 However, this flexible framework for channel-
ling contrasting interests requires not only a high degree of sense of com-
munity, but also strong institutions and rule of law, which are not present
in the AC yet.
Within this context of lacking a clear and effective common strategy,
Andean member countries actually are engaged in further negotiations
towards the establishment of South-South and North-South-PTAs. 87 The
following sub-sections address some of the main treaties in place or under
negotiation and make some comments on the role of the AIS and the
possible consequences of their implementation on the AC's nature and
future existence as a bloc.
B. THE GROUP OF THREE (G-3): COLOMBIA, MEXICO
AND VENEZUELA
Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela entered into a treaty on free trade in
accordance with the GATT, conferring upon it the nature of a PSECA
under LAIA's framework. 88 As for liberalization of trade in goods, the
G-3 agreement is based on a linear and automatic tariff reduction pro-
85. Guillermo Fernandez de Soto, General Secretary of the Andean Community, Ad-
dress at the XIV APC (June 27, 2003), available at http://www.comunidadandina.
org/rionegro/disFernandez.htm.
86. See Daniel Thurer, A Variable Geometry for Europe, at 4-5, available at http://
www.edu365.com/aulanet/comsoc/treballsrecerca/treballs0405/treballs-geom-
countr/variable.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2004).
87. For an excellent assessment on Latin American regionalism, see IDB, Mds Alki de
las Fronteras: El Nuevo Regionalismo en America Latina, available at http://www.
iadb.org/res/publications/pubfiles/pubB-2002S_4060.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2004).
For a general study of regionalism, see World Bank, Trade Blocs, available at http://
www.worldbank.org/research/trade/pdf/trade-blocs2.pdf (last visited Sept. 7,
2004).
88. See 1980 Montevideo Treaty, Aug. 12, 1980, art. 11, available at http://www.sice.
oas.org/trade/montev%5Ftr/Montevle.asp#intro.
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gram of 10 percent per year until the full completion of a FTA by mid
2004.89 The G-3 agreement acknowledges that Colombia and Venezuela
are members of the CA by establishing special rules in article 1-03 per-
taining to the two countries.90 However, it is important to note that after
three years of negotiations and discussions based upon different ap-
proaches and structures, the final agreement was strongly influenced by
NAFTA, including sectors such as services, investment, government pro-
curement and intellectual property. None of these subjects were negoti-
ated before in the previous Latin American South-South regional, sub-
regional, or bilateral PTAs.91 For instance, article X of the agreement
establishes the general principles applicable to the trade of services, and
article XII focuses on trade in financial services. As little research has
been done in these areas, gradual implementation will be conducive to a
better understanding of these special regimes and their consequences
within the domestic legal frameworks of the members. The objectives of
the G-3 are based on the principles of national treatment, most-favoured
nation treatment, and transparency. 92 The agreement has been formally
successful regarding the implementation of the gradual tariff reductions.
By July 2004, a great deal of sectors will be fully open. The achievement
of a complete G-3 FTA will not collide with the Andean regulation, as the
Andean CET was suspended until March 2005.
In addition, the completion of the G-3 FTA may also contribute to
changing the economic environment of the Andean countries. Colombia
and Venezuela have become major trading partners within the AC. At
the same time, there is increasing interest by Colombian and Venezuelan
exporters to reach the Mexican market. The situation is challenging how-
ever due to Mexico's stronger position in technology and infrastructure. 93
89. There are some products under special tariff reduction frameworks (soap and au-
tomobiles). See SANDRA ZULUAGA & OLGA LUCIA LOZANO, EL GRUPO DE Los
TRES (G-3): LAS NEGACIONES COMERCIALES ENTRE COLOMBIA, MI XICO Y VEN-
EZUELA [The Group of Three (G-3), the Commercial Negotiations Between Co-
lombia, Mexico and Venezuela] 181 (Antoni Estevadeordal & Carolyn Robert
eds., 2001).
90. Articles III, IV, V (section A), VI, VIII, IX, XVI, and XVIII of the G-3 Treaty do
not apply to those two countries. As such, G-3 recognizes the different obligations
acquired by its members in each one of the referred agreements. However, article
1-02,2 specifies that in the event of inconsistency between provisions of these trea-
ties and agreements and the provisions of the Treaty, G-3 prevail to the extent of
the inconsistency. Treaty on Free Trade Between the Republic of Colombia, the
Republic of Venezuela and the United Mexican States, available at http://www.
sice.oas.orgrTrade/G3_E/G3ETOC.asp (last visited Sept. 7, 2004) [hereinafter G-
3 Treaty].
91. The agreement was originally conceived under the traditional LAIA framework,
establishing a coherent schedule for progressive tariff reductions. Equally, it was
thought to include all AP member countries at the time. See ZULUAGA &
LOZANO, supra note 89, at 163-65.
92. See G-3 Treaty, supra note 90, art. 1-01.
93. The Colombian automobile industry is already feeling pressure as tariff reductions
are going to cover this sector soon. Competing against Mexican producers will be
very difficult. Voices seeking for postponing deadlines are starting to speak loudly
to the Colombian government. Will it listen? See La Prisa del TLC es de E U., EL
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Finally it is important to underline the AC's failure to act as a block in
achieving a 5 + 1 agreement during the negotiation process 94 as well as
the absence of interest by the remaining Andean partners to join the G-3
as a bloc. Bolivia has an independent FTA with Mexico similar in struc-
ture to the G-3. Peru and Ecuador have not started any negotiations yet.
C. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CAN-MERCOSUR FTA, THE
PROCESS TOWARDS ACTING WITH A SINGLE VOICE
The stages concerning the formation of a FTA between CAN and
MERCOSUR have been complex and have extended for a long period of
time. During the mid 1990s some Andean countries proposed negotiating
an agreement similar to the G-3 proposal rejected by MERCOSUR,
which favoured a scheme relating only to the trade of goods.95
In the meantime, MERCOSUR and Bolivia signed the ECA No. 36 on
December 17, 1996, under LAIA's framework. 96 Within the ECA's
objectives established in article 1, the contracting parties committed to
setting up an FTA within ten years, starting in 1997. To that end, the
contracting parties set up a detailed program of trade liberalization, regu-
lated in Section II, and a framework of rules aimed at facilitating gradual
trade liberalisation and dispute settlement. Even though it does not regu-
late trade in services as set forth, article 33 indicates that the contracting
parties will promote trade regulations according to WTO regulations.
Changing its position, the remaining countries signed a PTA with
MERCOSUR on April 16, 1998, the PSA AAP.A14TM No. 11, which set
up the framework for the creation of an FTA between these two blocks,
negotiating first the preferences given under the ALADI's framework
and establishing further progressive agreements in the future.
Peru, Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela (as members of the Andean
Community) signed a PSECA No. 39 with Brazil under LAIA's frame-
work on August 12, 1999.9 7 This agreement was aimed at establishing
fixed preferences among the contracting parties as a first step towards the
conformation of an FTA. It also set up a commission integrated by repre-
sentatives of certain institutions detailed in article 18, which is in charge
of its administration. Peru, Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela (as mem-
Tm~MPo, June 3, 2004, at 1-11; Arranca Renegociacion de G-3, EL TIEMPO -
PORTAFOL1O, June 11, 2004, at 6.
94. It was mainly due to the lack special treatment to the less developed Andean part-
ners and the broader agenda proposed by Mexico at the time. See ZULUAGA &
LOZANO, supra note 89, at 168.
95. See Frontaura, supra note 75, at 21.
96. Acuerdo de Complementaci6n Econ6mica N2 36 Celebrado entre los Gobiernos
de los Estados Partes del MERCOSUR y el Gobierno de la Reptiblica de Bolivia,
available at http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/mrcsbo/MERBOlS.asp (last visited
Sept. 7, 2004).
97. Acuerdo de Alcance Parcial de Complementaci6n Econ6mica entre los Gobiernos
de las Reptiblicas de Colombia, Ecuador, Pert y Venezuela, Parses Miembros de la
Comunidad Andina, y el Gobierno de la Reptiblica Federativa del Brasil, available
at http://www.sice.oas.orgrrrade/acecabrs/indice.asp (last visited Sept. 7, 2004).
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bers of the Andean Community) signed a PSECA No 48 with Argentina
under LAIA's framework on June 29, 2000, that was similar to PSECA
No. 39.
AC- MERCOSUR signed once more an ECA No. 56 on December 6,
2002, whereby they agreed to implement an FTA by 2003. However, it is
important to note that a PSECA between MERCOSUR and Peru was
signed on August 25, 2003 under LAIA's framework. 98 Its main purpose
is to establish the foundations for the formation of an FTA among the
contracting parties.
The remaining Andean countries, Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela,
finally reached an agreement with MERCOSUR by signing the ECA No.
59 on December 16, 2003. It takes into consideration the treaties already
signed with Bolivia and Peru for the constitution of an FTA between the
two blocks. It will enter into force by mid 2004.99 Like the previous
agreement, this agreement continues to promote a program based on a
progressive and automatic liberalization of tariffs and non-tariff barriers.
This process shows the difficulties the AC faces when negotiating with
strong counter-parties in the region. The strong cohesion required to act
with a single voice was diminished by the early agreements signed by Bo-
livia and Peru. Although the final result achieved in 2003 is an important
sign of political cohesion among South American nations, it also imposes
tremendous challenges to the Andean economic sectors, as Brazilian and
Argentinean products will start circulating in markets which used to be
highly protected from their competition. However, the road for increas-
ing cooperation, coordination, articulation and convergence between the
two blocks is already open. This scenario requires vigorous leadership
from the bodies and institutions of the AIS, close monitoring by private
interests and detailed converging supranational and domestic regulation.
D. THE ROLF OF THE AC IN THE NEGOTIATIONS TOWARDS THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FTAA AND ITS IMPLICATIONS:
ACTING WITH A SINGLE VOICE
As for the FTAA process itself, there is a great deal of literature availa-
ble on the subject.100 This sub-section only refers to the meaning and
98. Acuerdo de Complementaci6n Econ6mica No 58 Mercosur - Peri, available at
http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/MRCSRPER/ACE.asp (last visited Sept. 7, 2004).
99. Reuni6n MERCOSUR - CAN: Acta del Acuerdo de Complementaci6n
Econ6mica No. 59, Dec. 14-15, 2003, available at http://www.sice.oas.orgffrade/
mrcsrac/acta-s.asp.
100. See Jos6 Antonio Rivas-Campo & Rafael Tiago Jug Benke, FTA Negotiations:
Short Overview, 6(3) JIEL 661-694 (2003), available at htp://www.netamericas.net/
Researchpapers/Documents/Benke/Benke2.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2004); Sherry
M. Stephenson, The State of the FTAA Negotiations at the Turn of the Millennium,
6 LAW & Bus. REV. OF THE AM. 317 (2000); HERMINIO M. BLANCO, ET AL, A
KEY TO HEMISPHERIC INTEGRATION (INTAL-ITD, Occasional Paper No. SITI-03,
2004), available at http://www.iadb.org/intal/Ingles/Publicaciones/Blanco-
Zabludovsky-GLoraOP-SITI-03.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2004); Jagdish
Bhagwati, The FTAA is Not Free Trade, in TRADE: TOWARDS OPEN REGIONALISM
- PROCEEDINGS OF AN ANNUAL WORLD BANK CONFERENCE 13-19 (Shahid Javed
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results of acting with a single voice in the negotiations.
The APC received with interest the original proposal made by the
American Government in the Summit of the Americas in 1994,101 and has
consistently imparted instructions to the AIS in order to act jointly within
the negotiations. The Presidential guidelines have stressed the impor-
tance of ensuring an agreement that will offer the necessary conditions
for the equitable participation of the Andean countries, considering their
varying levels of development and the different sizes of their economies.
In the XIII Summit, Act of Carabobo 2001, APC entrusted ACFM and
CAC, with the assistance of AGS, with working on preparing, executing,
and following up a Community strategy within the context of the negotia-
tions towards the FTAA.
It is clear from the member countries' point of view that acting as a
bloc increases their bargaining power and also assists them with strategi-
cally protecting the sub-regional market already gained from sudden or
less progressive opening to non-members as a consequence of a badly
negotiated FTAA. 10 2 The AC already has in place an FTA that allows
member countries to have a single market for Andean products. As a
result, it has been easier for Andean countries to agree on certain matters
relating to trade in goods, bringing a joint position to the FTAA's negoti-
ation table.10 3
However, depending on the scope of application of the MFN clause
within the final FTAA agreement, the AFTA may not survive because it
risks being absorbed by the enhanced Hemispheric FTA. 1° 4 In addition,
the flexibility gained by the postponement of the Andean CET to 2005
may give a false sense of internal lack of consensus affecting their single
proposals and cohesion within the final part of the negotiations when the
most problematic issues are addressed.
Burki et al. eds., 1998); Joaquin Roy, El ALCA: Origen, Evolucidn, Consecuencias,
1-2 POLrICA INTERNAZIONALE 157-168 (2003); Joaquin Roy, Origen y Con-
secuencias de la Cumbre de Miami, in INTEGRACION EUROLATINOAMERICANA
559-575 (1996). On the possible effects of FTAA on AC in the area of investments,
see Comunidad Andina, Evaluaci6n de las Negociaciones del ALCA en Materia de
Inversiones: Posibles Resultados y Implicancias en la Conformacidn del Mercado
Comiin Andino [Report on the implications of FTAA in the field of investment
and it possible effects and implications on the ACM], available at http://www.
comunidadandina.org/documentos/docSG/SGdi543.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2004).
101. For information on the FTAA, see Free Trade Area of the Americas - FTAA
website, at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/alca-e.asp (last visited Sept. 7, 2004).
102. See Frontaura, supra note 75, at 21.
103. According to a press release by the AGS on Feb. 15, 2003, as consensus has been
reached on 86% of intra-Community trade, the Andean countries have proposed
to the FTAA negotiations tariff reduction periods of up to ten or more years. See
Press Release, High Level of Agreement Strengthens Andean Position in FFAA
(Feb. 15, 2003), available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/press/npl5-2-
03.htm.
104. See Fernando Gonzalez Vigil, La Comunidad Andina de Naciones (CAN) ante el
ALCA, IADB, at 5, available at http://www.iadb.org/intal/foros/gonzalez-vigil-
fl01.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2004).
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Following the NAFTA model, FTAA includes, among others, novel is-
sues such as trade in services, investment, copyright and government pro-
curement, making it more difficult for the Andean countries to reach a
concerted position. However, an important factor resultant from the
movement towards the establishment of the ACM and the convergence
G-3 may create is precisely this slow process towards the harmonization
of regulation related to these subjects. Although there is Andean regula-
tion in place related to intellectual property and also a framework for
trade in services, (see Table II), this Andean harmonization may collide
with the FTAA if the single voice gained by the Andean countries is not
enough to defend its vision on these subjects. 10 5
On March 19, 1998 the Andean countries started participating for the
first time as a bloc in the FTAA negotiations. Their joint participation in
the FTAA's groups, committees, and ministerial and vice-ministerial
meetings has resulted in the Andean Countries chairing three of the nine
negotiating groups. It has also permitted the AC member countries to
assume the chairmanships and vice-chairmanships of several of the
FTAA bodies. 10 6 This result is seen as a sign of success ensuring that the
region's interests are taken into account.
In the end,, whatever the results of the negotiations, the AC must con-
tinue speaking with a single voice internally, as the implementation of the
FTAA could change the economic 10 7 and legal structure of the Andean
countries. First, this scenario will pressure the AC to design adequate
policies to bring economic and financial stability to the region. Secondly,
it should result in the issuance of the regulations needed to properly im-
plement and enforce the commitments reached and to lead their domestic
implementation.
E. THE NEGOTIATION OF PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
BETWEEN SOME ANDEAN COUNTRIES AND THE UNITED
STATES: THE ROLE OF AND THE CONSEQUENCES
WITHIN THE AC
On Tuesday May 18, 2004, in Cartagena, Colombia, three members of
the AC started negotiations with the United States for the establishment
of a Free Trade Agreement. These negotiations resulted from at least
two circumstances. From the Andean countries point of view, negotiating
a PTA with the United States is core as the unilateral tariff preferences
granted to certain products by the U.S. Government, firstly through the
105. Julio Cesar Gil, The FTAA, a Step Further in the Consolidation of the Andean
Community, 62 CAPrrULOS DEL SELA 17, 20-21 (2001), available at http://lanic.
utexas.edu/-sela/AA2K1/ENG/cap/N62/rcap62-4.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2004).
106. For instance, Ecuador presided over the FTAA until November 1, 2002. See An-
dean Community, Free Trade Area of the Americas, available at http://www.comuni
dadandina.org/ingles/common/ftaa.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2004).
107. See Miles K. Light, Free Trade of the Americas Agreement Economic Impacts for
the Andean Community, Andean Community, available at http://www.comunida-
dandina.org/ingles/document/Alca.htm (Aug. 2003).
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Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) and later on by the Andean Trade
Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA) will expire in 2006.
There is an obvious need to preserve the advantages obtained and the
positions already gained by some Andean products within U.S. markets.
From the U.S. perspective, due to the difficulties present in the negotia-
tions towards the establishment of the FTAA and within the WTO Doha
Round, 10 8 the U.S. Trade Representative, Robert Zoellick, adopted a
policy of one-by-one negotiation. This policy has already delivered within
the region the US-Central America and the US-Chile PTAs.
1. From ATPA to ATPDEA
Due to difficulties generated by drug production in some Andean
countries, drug smuggling to and drug consumption in the United States,
a program was adopted in 1991for the promotion of economic alterna-
tives to drug-crop production in the Andean region. 10 9 The ATPA 10 au-
thorized the U.S. government to proclaim duty-free treatment for all
eligible articles from any beneficiary country, to designate beneficiary
countries, and to proclaim duty reductions for certain goods not eligible
for duty-free treatment. Consequently, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and
Peru were granted duty-free access to the U.S. market for a wide range of
approximately 5,600 products.11" '
From the beginning of the program, Colombia was the largest ATPA
trading partner of the United States, with flowers being its leading export
under the ATPA. Bolivia was the main supplier of jewelry and precious
metals, followed by Peru. The overall effect of ATPA imports on the U.S.
economy and consumers was considered small, whereas U.S. imports of
ATPA-exclusive products had a potentially significant effect on domestic
108. This was mainly as a consequence of the strong opposition from developing coun-
tries, such as Brazil and India, to accept certain conditions related to agricultural
subsidies. This issue is also sinking FTAA negotiations.
109. ATPA was also aimed at helping build the economies of the countries within the
sub-region and at strengthening democracy and sub-regional stability by providing
the Andean Governments with effective means to fight narco-terrorism. See Press
Release U.S. Department of State, Andean Trade Preference Act (Mar. 23, 2002),
available at, http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/8979pf.htm. ATPA considered bene-
fits similar to those granted under the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act,
known as the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) (1983, amended 1990). The United
States-Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA), (2000) amended CBI,
providing additional trade benefits. See H.R. 434, 106th Cong., 2d Sess. (2000),
available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/usdevact/act.asp#Title%2011%20-%
20CBI [hereinafter ATPA]. See also U.S. Department of Commerce, Andean
Trade Preference Act, available at http://www.mac.doc.gov/atpa/webmain/intro-re-
vise.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2004); International Trade Data System, Andean
Trade Preference Act (ATPA), available at http://www.itds.treas.gov/atpa.html (last
visited Sept. 7, 2004).
110. See ATPA, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/tradeact/ATPA.asp.
111. The list of ATPDA products is available at http://www.mincomercio.gov.coNBe
Content/NewsDetail.asp/ID=716&IDCompany=16 (last visited May 24, 2004). See
also U.S. Int'l Trade Commission, Andean Trade Preference Act (2nd Report): Ex-




ATPA expired ten years later on December 4, 2001. The duties for the
products included in the ATPA were reinstated at the time, and the pro-
gram was renewed and expanded in 2002 by the Trade and Development
Act of 2002.113 Division C, Title XXXI of the Act entitled the ATPDEA
rules the renewal and expansion of ATPA. Section 3102 amended section
208 of ATPA, establishing the termination of the preferential agreement
on December 31, 2006.
2. From ATPDEA to PTAs
Before extending the benefits granted under ATPDEA, the U.S. Presi-
dent estimates whether the eligible countries meet the suitability criteria
established in the law. Among others, and for the purposes of this article,
the following should be highlighted: (1) whether the beneficiary country
has demonstrated a commitment to participate in negotiations toward the
completion of the FTAA or another free trade agreement; and (2) the
extent to which the country provides protection of intellectual property
rights consistent with or greater than the protection afforded under the
WTO.
Certainly, the ATPA/ATPDEA process has influenced the Andean
countries during the last decade. When assessing the work towards the
establishment of the ACM, Table II indicates that one of the areas in
which Andean regulation has developed the most is precisely the protec-
tion of intellectual property rights. This effort made the countries not
only ready for ATPA/ATPDEA eligibility, at least in one of the long list
of criteria, but also promoted the harmonization of standards among the
sub-region. This is indeed an example of the consequences of developing
countries entering into agreements with developed nations. The expected
benefits of a North-South relation pressure the harmonization and con-
vergence of regulations which is very difficult to attain within South-
South integration schemes.
The unilateral tariff reduction granted under the previous compliance
of determined requirements has paved the way for a certain degree of
legal convergence among the ATPA/ATPDEA beneficiaries. This in turn
will make negotiations towards the PTAs less complicated and may ex-
112. "[Tjhe probable future effect of ATPA on the United States, as estimated by an
examination of export-oriented investment in the beneficiary countries, also is ex-
pected to be minimal in most sectors." ATPA also had a small, indirect, but posi-
tive effect on drug-crop eradication and crop substitution efforts in Bolivia and
Peru in 2001. It had limited effects in Colombia. See ANDEAN TRADE PREFER-
ENCE ACT: IMPACT ON U.S. INDUSTRIES AND CONSUMERS AND ON DRUG CROP
ERADICATION AND CROP SUBSTITUTION (U.S. International Trade Commission,
Investigation No. 332-352, 2002), available at http://www.usitc.gov/wais/reports/arc/
w3538.htm (last visited Sept 7, 2004). Full report available at ftp://ftp.usitc.gov/
pub/reports/studies/PUB3538.PDF (last visited Sept. 7, 2004).
113. Trade Act of 2002, available at http://otexa.ita.doc.gov/AGOA-CBTPA/H3009_CR.
pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2004).
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plain the U.S. decision to conduct them simultaneously with individual
Andean members.
It is also important to consider that the FTAA, if agreed, will dilute the
ATPDEA benefits because it allows all Latin countries equal access to
U.S. markets. This may generate trade-diversion and AC exports to the
United States may fall. 14 In this sense, the hurry evidenced in some of
the Andean countries to negotiate a PFT with the United States, perhaps
under better conditions and before other countries get preferential access
to the U.S. markets, makes sense for their individual interests. Perhaps
less when considering the bargaining powers the region could gain if ne-
gotiating as a bloc with the United States and Canada.
On the other hand, the ATPA/ATPDEA processes have been
originated by political, social, health and other national security related
issues which necessarily link the United States with the Andean coun-
tries. Colombia for instance, may try to play the political cards of being
both a reliable partner in the fight against terrorism as well as the victim
of the dangerously extended vermin of drug dealing and drug consump-
tion. However, it is clear that a PTA is a different proposition that goes
further than the unilateral granting of certain tariffs within the context of
a core program for the eradication of cocaine crops. Hence, the condi-
tions in these negotiations once again tend to accommodate the interest
of the parties, i.e., the best interests of the strongest party and the less
detrimental consequences for the rest.
No Andean government is going to take on the political hazard of fail-
ing to reach any agreements with the United States despite the trading
conditions offered by the American administration. The fear of losing
the positions already gained by some Andean products within the U.S.
markets and, therefore, the extreme pressure from the Andean local in-
terest groups will give little room for the Andean negotiators to maneu-
ver. In this sense, the Andean position is rather weak, as the counter
party is not under such stress and has enough experience in dealing with
countries facing similar conditions. Chile" 5 and Central American"16
countries, for example, ended up with similar NAFTA-styled agreements.
The defensive nature of these negotiations will find the Andean parties
looking for sensible frameworks for liberalization. Therefore, the role of
the Andean governments and of the interest groups should be that of
establishing and putting in place at the Andean and domestic levels, the
adequate policies which enable the maximum amount of Andean eco-
114. See Light, supra note 107.
115. For an analysis by AGS of the Agreement US-Chile, see ANALISIS DEL TRATADO
DE LIBRE CHILE - ESTADOS UNIDOS (AGS, Working Doc. No. SG/dt 221, 2003),
available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/documentos/docSG/SGdt221.pdf.
116. For an analysis by AGS of the Agreement US-Central America, see ANALISIS DEL
TRATADO DE LIBRE COMERCIO CENTROAMERICA - ESTADOS UNIDOS (AGS,
Working Doc. No. SG/di 620/Rev. 1, 2004), available at http://www.micip.gov.ec/
TLC/documentos/An %C3%Allsis%20del%20TLC%20CHILE-%20EEUU.pdf.
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nomic sectors to get ready for and to bare the consequences of competi-
tion, when tariffs finally reach zero.
In this sense, the AC has an important leading role to play. First of all,
it is core that the Andean Secretariat efficiently supports and follows up
the negotiations. Secondly, within an effort of articulation, coordination,
cooperation and convergence, the respective Andean bodies and institu-
tions of the AIS should discuss, establish and enact adequate policies and
related regulations to better prepare the sub-region for the positive and
negative consequences of the competition about to come. Having appro-
priate policies and regulations at the supranational level will shield any
attempt by local governments to delay or redirect whatever was gained
on the negotiation tables in detriment of the Andean citizens or any other
member country.
At the same time, strong leadership and understanding is required
within the Andean Secretariat, as Venezuela is not negotiating a PTA
with the United States, and Bolivia has not yet been invited to participate
in the negotiations. This article argues that the AC strongly relies on the
political will of its Presidents. There is momentum within three out of
five member governments to engage in a PTA with the United States. As
these agreements will certainly have direct and indirect consequences in
the AC, this political will should be channelled to attain adequate deci-
sion making within the AIS. Therefore, it is essential to direct this collec-
tive work in benefit of the sub-regional scheme and to have the stamina
required in order to propose and to support decisions that could change
temporarily or on a regular basis the nature or even the actual composi-
tion of the AC.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This article has been a journey through the Andean Integration since
its creation. It has defined it as a "top down process" which heavily relies
on the Presidential leadership of their members whose guidelines are be-
ing implemented by means of an elaborate system of bodies and institu-
tions. In this sense, the AC still substantially depends on the political
limitations of its leaders rather than the rule of law. It has been one of its
historical features and legacies. However, it is indeed a millstone able to
sink the pace of integration when the sub-region enters into politically
turbulent phases. This weakness in the AC structural design threatens
both the internal and external undertakings currently going on and dis-
cussed in this paper.
Even though these complex processes have already started and actions
are being taken, it is too early to draw a conclusion regarding the future
of the AC. However, the establishment of the ACM is such a crucial task
that indeed affects the welfare of the Andean citizens. Making ACM
functional on a scheme that scores extremely high when assessing politi-
cal risk might jeopardize its successful achievement. The simultaneous
negotiations of important mechanisms geared towards opening sub-re-
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gional boundaries to free trade is another element actually affecting the
efficiency of the AIS in order to comply with the timeframe given by the
APC to set it up.
In this sense, the answer lays in convergence. Almost all agreements in
place and the ones under negotiation, namely G-3, FTAA, and PTAs be-
tween some Andean countries and the United States already include or
might incorporate chapters related to subjects which are directly related
to sectors that should be liberated to establish a Common Market (capi-
tal, labour and services). Before issuing any Andean supranational rules,
the AIS should sensibly consider the adoption of a pragmatic approach
delaying the establishment of the ACM as it has already done with the
ACET, until the horizon is clearer.
At the same time, when issuing decisions concerning the movement of
capital, services and labor, they should incorporate at least minimum
standards that allow convergence with actual and future commitments
with non-members, bearing in mind the direct application of the Andean
supranational law into the domestic legal frameworks. By doing so, the
sub-region gains a great deal of supranational and domestic convergence
through the rule of law, ring-fencing with it what has already been
achieved against political risk.
This important work in the field of the rule of law will be meaningless
without the proactive participation of the private sector. Its influence will
shape the answer to the question about whether member countries are
ready to sacrifice their legitimate interests of securing and deepening
their relations with non-members in order to advance to greater Andean
consolidation. The internal cohesion required and the extraordinary ef-
forts of articulation, cooperation, co-ordination and convergence it takes
to implement the ACM and to carry on the demanding negotiation
processes, claim from the AIS prioritization of duties and finding the pre-
cise balances in order to overcome its historic sluggishness.
Offering a legal framework that allows the convergence of the ACM
with the external commitments of the member countries will be condu-
cive to reconcile the divided loyalties this complex environment is pro-
moting. Notwithstanding their differences and contrasting positions,
these demanding times require from all those involved not only a great
deal of loyalty and protection of their own countries' interests but also a
strong consciousness of the Andean related issues. Furthermore, those
involved must remain aware that they are all also citizens of an increas-
ingly globalized world.
